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I. INTRODUCTION: POSING THE QUESTION
May the government forcibly medicate an incompetent prisoner on death row
in order to make him legally sane, thereby allowing his execution to proceed?1
Consider a prisoner competent at trial and sentenced to death, but who sometime
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred 2001. This Comment is
dedicated to my mentor, Dr. Charles McCall, who introduced me to the savage nature of man and the pursuit of an
ideal, the elevated state of humanity. Credit for the choosing of this paper's subject rests with one of my greater
teachers, Professor Linda Carter. My thanks for the opportunity to write this piece are for, of course, my parents and
the nameless others who have brought me to this task.
1. It is important to note at the outset that this Comment does not enter the debate of whether anti-psychotic
drugs truly restore mental competency. This Comment instead addresses the constitutional implications of forcible
medication as an attempt to restore competency.
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later, during the stay on death row, becomes insane. Traditionally, the insanity of a
prisoner saved him due to the age-old commandment not to execute the insane. 2 This
situation frustrates the retributive and deterrent goals of punishment; with retribution
being robbed of the punishment a jury of the prisoner's peers felt was deserved, and
deterrence going unfulfilled without a punishment for the crime. In the past, nothing
could be done to settle such an impasse.
Modem science may have solved this dilemma by producing anti-psychotic
drugs that restore some level of competency to the mentally unstable mind. The use
of these drugs to maintain competency has facilitated completion of prisoners'
sentences.3 However, while medical science may have solved the functional problem
of executing the insane, it has raised new ethical and constitutional problems that
have never before been considered. Curing the insane was once thought to be an
impossibility. But with the advent of a cure, or at least what should be labeled a
treatment, comes the question whether prisoners should be medicated to achieve the
level of competence necessary for an execution? Does artificially imposing
competency satisfy the prohibition on executing the insane? May the state forcibly
disregard the prisoner's right to self determination and administer anti-psychotic
drugs? Is it ethical for the medical profession to provide these drugs in order to
facilitate an execution?
The goal of this Comment is to present the constitutional implications posed by
the medicate-to-execute scheme and provide opinions on how reviewing courts may
apply precedent. Part II of this Comment begins with a review of the constitutional
ban on executing the insane, and the proposed solution: forcible medication with
anti-psychotic drugs to restore the prisoner's sanity and proceed with the execution.
Part III provides a critique of two state courts' analyses of the medicate-to-execute
scheme. Part IV builds on the approach of the state courts by restating the issue in
terms of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This Comment concludes with the question remaining and the hope of
an answer.
II. PROBLEM & SOLUTION?
A. The Problem: The Ban on Executing the Insane
In a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court upheld the centuries-old
prohibition of executing the insane.4 The Ford Court held that the Eighth
2. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
3. See infra Part lI.B (discussing the case of Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) where the
Supreme Court first addressed the issue of forcibly medicating a prisoner with anti-psychotic drugs to allow his safe
incarceration).
4. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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Amendment5 guaranteed a right that English common law and all states then using
the death penalty had already granted: insane persons may not be executed.6 To do
otherwise would constitute cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by that
amendment.7
Although the Court decided that insane prisoners could not be executed, the
Court did not provide a definition of competency.8 Justice Powell was the sole voice
on the Court to give direction to the states when following this new precedent. 9
Powell felt that a condemned prisoner should be aware of the punishment and the
reason for its infliction.' ° This knowledge, according to Powell, was required to
fulfill the death penalty's goals of retribution and deterrence." This definition, like
many employed by the states, is not surprisingly unrelated to the medical definitions
of competency and insanity. 2 Use of definitions like this explain the seemingly
anomalous result in Ford-a prisoner adjudged to be mentally ill but still competent
to be executed. 3 Oddly, those who petitioned on the condemned prisoner's behalf
in Ford accepted this standard. 14 A similar approach was recommended by the
American Bar Association as part of its own two-prong test for competency. 15 The
5. "[N]or cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
6. Ford, 477 U.S. at 410.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 406-10 (discussing various rationales for not executing the insane but failing to define what
constitutes insanity).
9. Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring).
10. Powell stated his preferred standard for competency to be executed: "I would hold that the Eighth
Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and
why they are to suffer it." Id.
11. See id. at 421 ("One of the death penalty's critical justifications, its retributive force, depends on the
defendant's awareness of the penalty's existence and purpose."). Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, agreed:
"[T]he execution of an insane person... provides no example to others and thus contributes nothing to whatever
deterrence value is intended to be served by capital punishment." Id. at 407.
12. Powell's competency standard is not alone in its dissimilarity to medical standards of competency. The
M'Naghten Rule establishing the traditional test for the insanity defense at trial states that an acquittal should be
granted when "the party accused was labouring under such defect of reason, from disease of mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was
wrong." M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). Like Powell's standard, the
M'Naghten Rule is concerned with the cognitive understanding of the defendant, not the medical diagnosis of his
mental illness.
13. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 403-04 (noting that three of the psychiatrists that examined the condemned
prisoner found him to be suffering from different forms of psychosis but concluded that he was competent to be
executed); see also FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (West 1985) (defining the test employed in Ford's case for competency
as "whether [the condemned prisoner] understands the nature and effect of the death penalty and why it is to be
imposed upon him.").
14. Brief for Petitioner at 24, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (No. 85-5542) ("In the death penalty
context, the condemned must be able to understand, first, that he is being put to death, and second, that he is being
put to death because he killed."),
15. That test was composed of a cognition prong, essentially Powell's standard, and an assistance prong,
declaring a prisoner to be incompetent if he were unable to assist his attorney in representing his own interests. See
Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 55-56 (S.C. 1993) (providing an explanation of the American Bar Association's
two-prong test for competency). This later prong was rejected by Powell as unnecessary due to procedural
guarantees in modern American jurisprudence. Ford, 477 U.S. at 420-21.
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proposed standard for mental competence to be executed, therefore, is not
necessarily entwined in the idea of mental health. Instead, it centers on cognition,
a required understanding of the crime and the resulting punishment.16
While the Ford Court found universal support for the prohibition against
executing the insane, the rationale behind it was not unanimously accepted. 7 The
reasoning behind an established rule is not always questioned, and in Ford, the
Court felt that the already ancient common-law prohibition against executing insane
criminals must have been in the Framers' minds when they introduced the Bill of
Rights, and was therefore encompassed within the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
of "cruel and unusual punishment."' 8 The established nature of this prohibition was
not in doubt; great names from legal history, such as Blackstone and Sir Edmund
Coke, supported this ancient notion.' 9 But perhaps the greatest statements in support
of the prohibition against executing the insane came from the Ford Court itself.
Common law and history are helpful, but the Court has recognized that
"evolving standards of human decency 20 continually shape and transform the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment; thus, leaving the Court with the final decision
of "whether a particular punishment comports with the fundamental human dignity
that the Amendment protects,' '21 This inquiry normally involves two parts: an
examination of objective indicia of public sentiment as evidenced by legislative
enactment, and an abstract judgment by the Court 22 of what constitutes evolving
standards of decency.23 In Ford, plain evidence of the former approach can be seen
when the Court noted that no jurisdiction in the United States allowed the execution
of the insane.24 Because of this clear indication of public sentiment, the common law
justifications for the prohibition are still compelling in the modem context. The
16. Ford, 477 U.S. at 422.
17. "Unanimity of rationale... we do not find." Id .at 408.
18. Id. at 405-08.
19. See Brief for Petitioner at 10, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (No. 85-5542) (noting "no less
than five rationales" supporting the prohibition on executing the insane existing at common law).
20. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) ("The Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.").
21. Ford, 477 U.S. at 406.
22. "The Court also must ask whether it comports with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the
amendment." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 100).
23. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 102 (employing the "head counting" approach by counting the number of
"civilized nations of the world" with regard to the imposition of the penalty of statelessness as a punishment for a
crime); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-82 (noting such "objective indicia that reflect public attitude toward a given
sanction" as legislative enactments by the states and nations of the world and jury verdicts); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822-33 (1988) (same); see also id. at 833 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,797
(1982) ("It is for [the Court] ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death
penalty.").
24. Ford, 477 U.S. at 408.
25. The Court has given great weight to the pattern of legislative enactments from the federal and state
governments as a reflection of the notion of evolving standards of decency. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 293 (1976) (plurality opinion); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-97 (1977) (plurality opinion);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. at 789-96 (1982); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. at 823-31 (1988); Penry v.
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abstract judgment by the Court of the meaning of evolving standards of decency can
be observed in the majority opinion by Justice Marshall and the concurring opinion
of Justice Powell.26
The abstract judgment by the Court of what constitutes evolving standards is
best exemplified by Gregg v. Georgia where the Court noted that the Eighth
Amendment embraces a core concept of human dignity. 27 This concept declares that
punishments "cannot be so totally without penological justification that it results in
the gratuitous infliction of suffering."28 This justification is found if and where the
punishment serves the goals of deterrence and retribution.29 The Court supported the
proposition that for the death penalty to be justified in any context,3° including
execution of the insane, it must serve one of these two goals.3
In addressing the problem of deterrence in this context, Justice Marshall cited
to Coke for the basic proposition that executing the insane does not deter criminals
since the insane are not representative of society at large.32 They are a special class
considered to be incompetent and therefore not responsible for their own actions.33
Because criminals would not identify themselves with this group, they would not be
deterred by the harsh punishment inflicted upon the insane prisoner.34 Furthermore,
because they are a unique class defined by their irrationality, one cannot truly expect
the insane to be served by an example of their own being punished. 35 Deterrence,
therefore, is not served by executing the insane.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333-35 (1989).
26. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 407-10 (discussing the goals of deterrence and retribution that form the basis of
the "core concept of human dignity" found in the Eighth Amendment); id. at 421-23 (Powell, J., concurring) (same).
27. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182 (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 ("The basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.")).
28. Id. at 183.
29. In its brief before the Court, the petitioner encouraged the Justices to adopt a proportionality analysis
when considering the execution of insane prisoners. The punishment, petitioner felt, was excessive and in violation
of the Eighth Amendment since it did not serve the goals of the death penalty: deterrence and retribution. See Brief
for Petitioner at 13-16, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (No. 85-5542) (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 798 (1982), for the proposition that the societal goals of the death penalty are deterrence and retribution, and
discussing the failure of these goals in the context of executing the insane).
30. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168 (answering petitioner's contention that the death penalty was per se "cruel
and unusual" in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
31. Id. at 183.
32. Ford, 477 U.S. at 407.
33. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (No. 85-5542); see also Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 678 (1962) ("We would forget the teachings of the Eighth Amendment if we allowed
sickness to be made a crime and permitted sick people to be punished for being sick. This age of enlightenment
cannot tolerate such barbarous action.").
34. Ford, 477 U.S. at 407.
35. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 ("Nothing can more strongly illustrate... the [untenable] proposition,
equally objectionable in its humanity and its logic, that the insane should be punished for criminal acts, in order to
deter other insane persons from doing the same thing.").
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Justice Powell, in his concurrence, continued by examining the goal of
retribution in the death penalty context. 36 Following Powell's definition of
competence, a prisoner who was "unaware of the punishment they are about to
suffer and why they suffer it" could not be executed.37 Powell stated, "[o]ne of the
death penalty's critical justifications, its retributive force, depends on the
defendant's awareness of the penalty's existence and purpose. 38 An insane person
could not understand the weight of their impending death and the reason for the
punishment thus robbing the punishment of any retributive value. 39 Executing the
insane, therefore, would not serve the goal of retribution.
In a passing fashion, the Court, through Justice Powell, noted Gregg's
commandment that the core value of protecting human dignity requires that a
punishment not result in "gratuitous infliction of suffering."''4 Justice Powell wrote
of the cruelty of executing the insane, "[m]ost men and women value the
opportunity to prepare mentally and spiritually for death," but noted that the
incompetent would not be able to do this.4 ' An added element of suffering would
exist in this case because the condemned was taken through an unknown and
frightening process that would culminate in his own death.
In addressing this point of unnecessary suffering, the petitioner in Ford made
excellent use of case law by noting a similar plea for human dignity in
Superintendent of Belchertown School v. Saikewicz.42 In Saikewicz, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court supported the decision of a guardian of a "profoundly
retarded man" to prevent chemotherapy treatments for his illness.43 The man would
have otherwise been forced to undergo painful treatments made all the worse
because he did not know their purpose or even possess the knowledge or hope of a
possible recovery.44 The incompetent patient in that case was spared, as was the
incompetent defendant in Ford, because of his ignorance of his potential fate.
Influencing the Court was the idea that human dignity commands that we do not
force the innocent or the ignorant to suffer what they do not comprehend.45
36. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 421 (Powell, J. concurring) (discussing the goal of retribution and its frustration
in the case of executing the insane).
37. Id. at 422 (Powell, J. concurring).
38. Id. at421.
39. Id. at 422 ("If the defendant perceives the connection between his crime and his punishment, the
retributive goal of the criminal law is satisfied.").
40. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
41. Ford, 477 U.S. at 421.
42. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); see also Brief for Petitioner at 17-18, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399
(1986) (No. 85-5542) (discussing the element of human dignity found in the Eighth Amendment through the
example of Saikewicz).
43. Superintendent of Belchertown School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 430.
44. Id.
45. See e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 456 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) ("This punishment is offensive to cardinal principles
for which the Constitution stands. It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress. He knows
not what discriminations may be established against him, what proscriptions may be directed against him, and when
and for what cause his existence in his native land may be terminated.").
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B. The Proposed Solution: Medicating Prisoners Against Their Will
An answer to the State's problem of executing the insane might be found in the
use of anti-psychotic drugs.46 Under the influence of anti-psychotic medication, a
prisoner could come to realize the impact of his crimes and the reason for his
punishment.47 This treatment results in some level of rationality in patients, s and
could, under the right circumstances, meet Powell's test of competency.49 As a
rational human being, he would then meet Powell's retribution goal.5 ° By
medication, the prisoner would attain an artificial sanity,5' step out of the special
class of the insane, and thereby perhaps serve the goal of deterrence as an example
with which other criminals could identify.52 Of course, this "solution" would
probably meet the stern refusal of any death row inmate with a sense of self-
preservation.53 Accordingly, medication would have to be administered against the
prisoner's will, which will raise new constitutional issues.
The closest opinion the Supreme Court has issued on this point comes from
Washington v. Harper54 In Harper, a prisoner sought a finding from the Supreme
Court that the involuntary administration of anti-psychotic drugs, as allowed by a
state regulation, violated his Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.55
Harper was not a death row prisoner; he was an inmate in a normal prison
environment. 6 The medication in his case was meant to treat his psychotic condition
so as to minimize the danger he posed to himself and others-not to render him sane
for purposes of execution.57
46. The "problem" is the prohibition on executing the insane as found in Ford, 477 U.S. at 410.
47. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 214 (stating that anti-psychotic drugs would "assist the patient in organizing
his or her thought processes and regaining a rational state of mind.").
48. Amicus in Harper described anti-psychotic medication as the "only effective treatment" for serious
mental illnesses calling the drugs the "true liberators of the mentally ill." This seems to be true if one accepts
amicus' characterization of the effect of anti-psychotic medication as freeing the mentally ill from their delusions
and allowing rational thought. Brief Amici Curiae of Washington Community Mental Health Council, et al., at 8-10,
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No. 88-599).
49. See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text (discussing Powell's proposed cognition standard for
competency for purposes of execution).
50. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (detailing Justice Powell's opinion of retribution and the
need for competence to serve that goal the death penalty context).
51. See infra notes 161-65 and accompanying text (questioning whether the state of "competency" imposed
by anti-psychotic medication is the appropriate standard of competency intended by the Court in Ford).
52. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Marshall's assessment of deterrence
and executing the insane).
53. Oddly, medical authorities who submitted amicus curiae briefs in Harper stated that the refusal of most
patients to submit to the administration of anti-psychotic drugs stems from the "severity of [their] mental illness and
the extent of [their] psychosis." Brief Amici Curiae of Washington Community Mental Health Council, et al., at
8, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No. 88-599).
54. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
55. Id. at 220.
56. Id. at 213-14.
57. Id. at 214-15.
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In what remains a controversial decision, the Court ruled that Washington may
administer anti-psychotic drugs to a prisoner against his will. 8 This decision was
reached only after finding some accommodation between the prisoner's substantive
due process rights,59 which the Court recognized are limited by the realities of
confinement,6° and the needed deference to prison officials as the best administrators
of correctional facilities.6'
To accommodate these competing interests, the Court applied a factor-balancing
test used to determine the validity of the state regulation when conflicting with the
prisoner's substantive due process rights.62 The Court asked whether the regulation
was "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests., 63 This less than strict
scrutiny review would apply even in cases where the claimed constitutional liberty
was a fundamental right.64 Three factors would be considered in determining
whether the regulation was reasonable: (1) whether there was a "valid, rational
relation between the legitimate governmental interest" and the regulation; (2) the
potential impact on the prison environment of accommodating the right; and (3) "the
absence of ready alternatives" to the regulation.65
When considering the first and second factors of the test, the controlling
circumstance seems to be the State's motivation in medicating the prisoner. In
Harper, the State chose to medicate the prisoner to guarantee prisoner and staff
safety.66 This included not only other prisoners but Harper as well, since his mental
illness posed a risk that he might injure himself.67 The Court recognized the State's
motivation in this instance, not just as a legitimate purpose, but as a duty.68 In
affirming this duty, the Court acknowledged that the justification for medicating a
prisoner against his will was dependant upon the medication serving the inmate's
58. Id. at 227.
59. See id. at 221-22 (recognizing that the Due Process Clause granted the prisoner the right to refuse
treatment).
60. "The extent of a prisoner's right ... must be defined by the context of the inmate's confinement." Id.
at 222.
61. See id. at 222-26 (discussing the limitation of a prisoner's substantive due process rights because of the
realities of the prison environment).
62. This particular test originated in Turner v. Safley where a Missouri inmate challenged state procedures
forbidding correspondence and marriage between inmates. The test applied was one of accommodation that
recognized the retention of prisoners of their Due Process rights and the needed deference to prison authorities as
those best equipped to manage the demands of penal institutions. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987).
63. Harper, 494 U.S. at 223.
64. In Harper, the Court chastised the Ninth Circuit for applying an improper test, and stated "[w]e made
quite clear that the standard of review we adopted ... applies to all circumstances in which the needs of prison
administration implicate constitutional rights [of the prisoner]." Id. at 224.
65. Id. at 225. The final factor was qualified by the Court's statement that authorities would not be required
to "set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative." Id.
66. Id. at 214-16 (discussing the State policy that allowed the medication ofa prisoner against his will when
his mental illness posed a threat to himself or others).
67. Id.
68. "Prison administrators have not only an interest in ensuring the safety of prison staffs and administrative
personnel, but also have a duty to take reasonable measures to ensure the prisoners' own safety." Id. at 225.
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medical interest.69 The satisfaction of the second factor is likewise entwined with the
duty of guaranteeing prisoner and staff safety 7 -allowing a potentially violent
prisoner to resist medical treatment would endanger not only the prisoner, but other
inmates and prison staff.71 When considering the relation between these two factors,
the test does not seem to allow the state to divorce the interests of the prisoner from
the interests of the prison environment when it seeks to medicate the prisoner
against his will.
72
The clear absence of other suitable alternatives to treat, or at least manage,
Harper's mental illness played a large role in this decision allowing an invasion into
the prisoner's body.73 In addressing this factor, the Court felt that other alternatives,
such as physical restraints, would be dangerous to both the prisoner and correctional
officers.74 Sedation was not considered to be an option since it was not really
medical treatment; it would constitute mere warehousing of a prisoner and would
not benefit the patient in any other meaningful way than rendering him a body easily
manipulated by prison staff.75 Warehousing was an option despised by both the
Court and health officials who had submitted amicus curiae briefs in the case.76
Medication, on the other hand, was a viable treatment option that could restore a
level of competency and rationality to the patient, thereby minimizing the dangers
to himself and others posed by his mental illness.77
69. Id. at 222.
70. See id. (stating the second factor as a consideration of the "impact accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates").
71. Jd.at227.
72. "Where an inmate's mental disability is the root cause of the threat he poses to the inmate population,
the State's interest in decreasing the danger to others necessarily encompasses an interest in providing him with
medical treatment for his illness." Id. at 225-26; see also id. at 227 (holding that forcible medication is only
appropriate where there is a danger to the prison environment because of the mental illness, and medication is found
to be in the prisoner's medical interest).
73. See id. at 226-27 (discussing alternative methods proposed by respondent and rejected by the Court as
either ineffective or even dangerous to the respondent); see also Brief Amici Curiae of Washington Community
Mental Health Council, et al., at 8, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No. 88-599) ("[F]or most serious
mental illnesses which cause psychotic behavior, antipsychotic medications are the only effective treatment.").
74. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 226-27 (noting the long-term degenerative effects of restraints on a prisoner and
the serious danger posed to prison staff when applying or removing the prisoner from restraints); see also Oral
Argument before the Court in Washington v. Harperat 9 ("A person who is under [physical] restraint can oftentimes
injure himself. He can injure nerves or muscles fighting at the restraints. He can become dehydrated. He could have
a heart attack.").
75. Brief Amici Curiae of Washington Community Mental Health Council, et al., at 11, Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No. 88-599); see also Oral Argument before the Court in Washington v. Harper at
5 (characterizing use of physical restraints as merely warehousing the mentally ill).
76. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 222 n.8 ("[A]nti-psychotic medications can be administered only for treatment
purposes."); see also Brief Amici Curiae of Washington Community Mental Health Council, et al., at 11,
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No. 88-599) ("[C]onfinement of the mentally ill without treatment
would be unacceptable, amounting to no more than preventive detention.").
77. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 214 (stating the effect of anti-psychotic drugs as "that the medication will assist
the patient in organizing his or her thought processes and regaining a rational state of mind."); see also Brief Amici
Curiae of Washington Community Mental Health Council, et al., at 8, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)
(No. 88-599) ("[For most serious mental illnesses which cause psychotic behavior, antipsychotic medications are
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The lesson in Harper is clear-the rights of the prisoner and the needs of the
state are inextricably bound together. The prisoner does have a right to refuse
medical treatment, but this right is limited by the duty of the state to ensure a safe
prison environment for the prisoner, guards, and other inmates.78 This duty does not
allow the state to neglect the insane prisoner or to leave him as a victim to his own
insanity which could cause him to injure himself. The state, acting under itsparens
patriae role, must act in the interest of the prisoner and give him medical treatment
that he requires. Harper then requires that the state medicate the prisoner when "the
inmate is dangerous to himself or others[,] and the treatment is in the inmate's
medical interest. 79
If one were to apply Harper to the medicate-to-execute situation, the state's
purpose in medicating could change. 80 The state would no longer be medicating the
prisoner for his interest, but rather for the facilitation of an execution. A prisoner on
death row would still exist in the custodial environment that justified medication
against the prisoner's will in Harper.81 At least in this context, the justification for
medication to ensure a safe prison environment still exists since Harper would seem
to apply whenever a prisoner awaiting execution on death row became a danger to
himself or others because of his mental illness. 82 However, Harper could be
distinguished on the simple grounds that it does not contemplate the possibility of
the medicate-to-execute scheme since Harper did not involve a death row inmate.83
Furthermore, the second justification in Harper seems inapplicable to this situation
since it may be difficult, if not impossible, to ever argue that it is in a prisoner's
"medical interest" to be medicated so he can be executed.84 In which case, Harper
may not apply and the Court may require further consideration of the issue.
Other considerations may call for a modification of Harper and Ford in the
death penalty context.85 Amicus argued in Harper that a patient left untreated would
the only effective treatment.").
78. Id. at 227.
79. Id.
80. See id at 225-26 (noting that the State's interest in medicating the prisoner was to ensure both a safe
prison environment and see to the medical interests of the prisoner).
81. "There are few cases in which the State's interest in combating the danger posed by a person to both
himself and others is greater than in a prison environment." Id. at 225.
82. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (noting the Court's characterization of the state's role in
caring for its inmates as an affirmative duty).
83. See supra text accompanying note 56 (noting that Harper was not a death row prisoner).
84. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 227 (holding that forcible medication is only valid where it serves both the
State's interest in maintaining a safe prison environment and is in the prisoner's medical interest).
85. Those opposed to the Harper decision have complained that the Court did not consider some of the side
effects associated with anti-psychotic medication. The existence of these side effects and their true impact seem
debatable. Amicus in support of the petitioner in Harper noted "[A]ntipsychotic medications have no effect on
memory, and do not appear to have any effect on attention or perception, or psychomotor functioning." Amicus,
in this example, portrayed anti-psychotic drugs as truly beneficial, and the only "effective" treatment for psychosis
in many cases. Amicus did admit to some "adverse side effects" such as tardive dyskinesia, a syndrome causing
involuntary movements of facial muscles, but noted that this syndrome could be treated if caught in the earlier
stages. Despite these problems, Amicus concluded that anti-psychotic medications are effective and are the "true
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"languish in an institution, and may even deteriorate."8 6 A prisoner saved by Ford's
prohibition on executing the insane and exercising his right to refuse anti-psychotic
medication may end up in this situation.87 With a sentence commuted to life in
prison, he would be sentenced to a lifetime of madness. Slowly withering, bound in
physical restraints and left in isolation for the safety of others, he would live outside
the light of reason with the option of a cure, or at least a treatment, withheld because
of his own sense of self-preservation. If he takes the treatment, he could become
competent for execution. If he refuses to, and chooses to save his own life, he is left
in madness. One cannot ignore the cruelty in this choice.
I1. THE STATES' RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S SILENCE
Medicating insane prisoners on death row so as to facilitate their execution
provides both answers and new questions. Following the Ford opinion, the reasons
for prohibiting the execution of the insane seem to be solved with a restoration of
competency. However, the justification for medicating an insane prisoner, at least
as defined by the Harper case, may not be present in this context.88 Death row
prisoners may seek to challenge a state's attempt to medicate-to-execute as being a
violation of their substantive due process rights or as a violation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. However, the United
States Supreme Court has yet to speak on the matter.
Three states have provided answers to the controversial medicate-to-execute
scheme, but a close examination of each reveals shortcomings and reasoning with
limited transferable value. The solution proposed by the Arkansas Supreme Court
is an example of misapplied precedent with muddled reasoning.89 The approach
taken by the Louisiana Supreme Court, which was later accepted in form by the
South Carolina Supreme Court, involves a more thorough appraisal of the problem.9°
Regretfully, its holding was limited to state constitutional provisions which can only
be of minimal persuasive value for other courts. These state cases demonstrate
experiments in testing the medicate-to-execute scheme, yet they are not
determinative of the issue.
liberators of the mentally ill." Brief Amici Curiae of Washington Community Mental Health Council, et al., at 9-10,
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No. 88-599).
86. Id. at4.
87. This is assuming that the Court refuses to extend Harper's application to the medicate-to-execute
context.
88. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 227 (allowing the medication of a prisoner against his will only when "the
inmate is dangerous to himself or others, and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest.")
89. Singleton v. Norris, 992 S.W.2d 768 (Ark. 1999); cert. denied 528 U.S. 1084 (2000).
90. In Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53,60 (S.C. 1993), the South Carolina Supreme Court cited and applied
virtually the same reasoning as the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 753 (La. 1992),
when it invalidated the medicate-to-execute scheme on state constitutional grounds.
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A. The Arkansas Solution: Ignoring the Question
In Singleton v. Norris,9' the state's purpose in medicating the condemned
prisoner seemed to decide the issue for the Arkansas Supreme Court. In that case,
Charles Singleton argued the administration of anti-psychotic drugs to him against
his will to make him competent92 violated his due process rights and was therefore
unconstitutional.93 Singleton was a very unique case; he had already been on a
regimen of anti-psychotic drugs for several years.94 After his appeal options had run
out, he made a last minute effort to go off the drugs and thereby become
incompetent and escape the death penalty.95
The Arkansas Supreme Court saw the issue differently than did Singleton. 96
Following Washington v. Harper, the court recognized the duty of prison officials
to forcibly administer anti-psychotic drugs to a prisoner to protect himself or
others.97 Singleton was medicated for this purpose, to assure a safe custodial
environment. 98 Perhaps because of the long history of medication in this case, prior
to the running of Singleton's appeals from his death sentence, 99 the court found that
the state's purpose in medicating Singleton was "necessary for [his] own good and
for the safety of others" and was not motivated by the hope of making him
competent for execution.'00 The court described this result as merely collateral and
gave it no weight at all.' 1 As such, Washington v. Harper was found to be
controlling. 102
The Arkansas court ignored the issue central to the case, whether Harper
should, or even could, apply as binding precedent. That court seemed to assume that
Harper could apply to any insane prisoner, even in the death penalty context. 103 This
assumption ignores clear and repeated statements by the United States Supreme
Court that "death is different" and procedures associated with putting a human to
91. 992 S.W.2d 768 (Ark. 1999); cert. denied 528 U.S. 1084 (2000).
92. Id. at 769.
93. The Arkansas Court applied the cognition standard favored by Justice Powell (citing Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J. concurring) (allowing the execution of a prisoner only when he understood
the death penalty as a punishment and why it was being inflicted upon him)). Id.
94. Id. at 769.
95. Id.
96. Id. (noting that Singleton argued that the State may not medicate him against his will to facilitate his
execution).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 770.
99. Id. at 769.
100. Id. at 770.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. "Washington v. Harper... remains appropriate as long as [the prisoner] is alive and is either a potential
danger to himself or others." Id. at 769.
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death must be accepted with a greater responsibility and respect than was afforded
to the issue by the Arkansas court. 1°4
The stark difference between Singleton and Harper is the final penalty of death.
As noted above, Harper was not a death penalty case. 105 The United States Supreme
Court did not anticipate or even mention the possibility of forced medication in the
death penalty context. This fact alone leads one to question the short treatment of
the issue by the court in Singleton. If the controlling precedent was decided only
after applying a factor balancing test based on the particular facts of that case, one
has to admit that its application elsewhere, in a context where the punishment is
irrevocable, is questionable. °6 For this reason, the Arkansas Supreme Court clearly
erred by not even considering the possibility that Harper could be distinguished.
The failures of the Arkansas court do not end with just one oversight-the court
also ignored an issue central to the Harper holding, the medical interest of the
prisoner °7 One can easily accept, especially after considering the amicus briefs
presented in Harper, the duty of the state to medicate a prisoner for his and others'
safety.' O8 What is not so easy to accept is the Arkansas court's denial of the second
tenet of Harper, that the medication may only validly be administered when it is in
the inmate's medical interest. 19 This interest seems clear when the inmate's mental
illness causes him to harm himself, but the question of interests becomes very
confused when the prisoner's forcible medication will facilitate his eventual death.
The prisoner's short term interests are met when he is medicated, but his long term
hopes are crushed when this medication allows the furtherance of his execution.
Such a difficult question of interests needs to be resolved, not ignored.
The reported motivation of medicating Singleton was to guarantee prison
safety."0 Strangely, this ignores the final moments of the prisoner's life, when he
is restrained in the death chamber, awaiting execution. He is physically bound or
restrained, and cannot harm others, much less himself. In those final moments, the
state's obligation of ensuring a safe environment is fulfilled without the use of anti-
104. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (holding that because the death penalty
is so final and irrevocable, there is a heightened need for reliability in death penalty procedures). But cf Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1,9-10 (1989) (citing Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249,256 (1988) and Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) for the proposition that the "death is different" rationale only requires a heightened
procedural requirements during the determination of eligibility and sentencing of death, not for post-sentencing
proceedings).
105. Supra note 59 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (detailing the factor-balancing test applied by the Court
in Harper).
107. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 227 (allowing states to forcibly medicate a prisoner against his will only when
the inmate's mental illness poses a danger to himself or others and when the medication is "in the inmate's medical
interest").
108. See supra notes 73-79 (discussing the arguments made by amicus that the duty of the state was to see
to the safety and welfare of its prisoners).
109. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227.
110. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (discussing Arkansas' motivation in medicating
Singleton).
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psychotic drugs, but the drugs still have an effect. In those last minutes, the drugs
guarantee the prisoner's rational understanding-competency-that very thing
whose absence prevented his execution before the administration of the drugs. In
these final moments, the barrier posed by Ford is lifted, and the drugs provide the
state with a final solution to facilitate the execution, competency of the accused. It
belittles this effort to merely call the result collateral.
B. Louisiana's Approach: Avoiding the Issue
In State v. Perry,"' the Louisiana Supreme Court was given the question not
available to the Arkansas Supreme Court1"2: May the state forcibly administer anti-
psychotic drugs to a prisoner to make him competent for execution? The court took
on the issue directly, unlike the Arkansas Supreme Court, but the Louisiana court
distinguished Harper, finding it inapplicable to the facts of Perry's case and went
on to decide the matter on state constitutional grounds." 3 For other courts, the Perry
decision can only be persuasive since it was based on a state constitutional provision
unique and different in its history and language to other states' constitutional
provisions. However, one might draw an important example from the case's
treatment of Harper and its own interpretation of the validity of the medicate-to-
execute scheme.
Michael Perry was convicted and sentenced to death by a Louisiana trial court;
however, after sentencing, a sanity hearing was conducted. 14 That hearing found
Perry to suffer from an "incurable schizoaffective disorder," thereby barring his
execution as an incompetent prisoner." 5 The trial court found that this condition
could be treated, but not cured, by the use of anti-psychotic drugs, allowing an
artificial sanity to be temporarily imposed." 6 Following Ford v. Wainwright, the
only way for Louisiana to execute Perry was to administer anti-psychotic medication
to him."7
In distinguishing Washington v. Harper, the Louisiana Supreme Court seized
upon the state's motivation in administering the drugs to Perry as determinant." 8
Louisiana's motivation seems to be in direct conflict with an integral part of the
Harper opinion, that the treatment be in the medical interest of the patient. In
111. 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992).
112. See supra notes 97-100 (discussing the state's motivation in medicating the prisoner in Harper was to
guarantee prison safety, not to further the execution of the prisoner).
113. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 755.
114. Id.
115. Id.; see also supra Part II.A (discussing the holding of Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986),
prohibiting the execution of the insane).
116. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 747.
117. See id. at 749 ("Without the administration of antipsychotic drugs, Perry cannot pass any known test of
competency.").
118. See id. at 751-55 (distinguishing Harper's application in the context of Perry's case).
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Perry's case, the state sought to medicate him to allow his-execution, his death.119
Under no stretch of the imagination could this be labeled as being within his medical
interest. 20 The court found that the state was precluded from making the former
argument in this case because of the lower trial court's earlier ruling that medication
was to facilitate the execution.12' On this ground alone, Harper could be
distinguished.
The Louisiana court also seized on a broad idea of medical treatment as being
implicitly present in Harper.122 This seems congruent with the United States
Supreme Court, especially after considering its position that medication should be
offered to further some form of treatment and not result in the mere warehousing of
mentally ill prisoners. 123 The Perry court's main justification for ignoring Harper
in this context was that the proposed use of forcible medication would be
"antithetical to the basic principles of the healing arts.' 24 This broad concept of
medical treatment embraced ideas of patient autonomy, a physician-patient
relationship of trust, and ethics of medicine.
125
In addressing patient autonomy, the court seemed to argue for a patient having
control over decisions related to his well-being. 26 This reasoning fails to consider
the clear statement in Harper that a prisoner's rights are limited by the demands of
the prison environment, and may, if circumstances permit, be overridden by the
state. 27 Furthermore, the Perry court's position seems to ignore the inability of a
person found to be mentally incompetent to make basic decisions as to his own
welfare.
In its most compelling argument, the Perry court determined that a physician
would violate his professional ethical obligations if he assisted the state in forcibly
medicating a prisoner on death row to impose a level of competency on the
prisoner.12 This may possibly constitute participation in an execution, an act which
both the American Medical Association and the American Psychiatric Association
119. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 748.
120. Id. at 754.
121. "Having conducted this proceeding with the single-minded purpose of forcibly medicating Perry in order
to execute him .... the state cannot now contend that it genuinely seeks to uphold the trial court's forced medication
order merely to further Perry's best medical interest and the safety of Perry and others in the prison setting." Id.
122. Id. at 751.
123. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's opposition to medication to merely
warehouse inmates with mental illnesses).
124. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 751.
125. Id. at 752.
126. "[T]he patient's autonomy rights are violated because he is not permitted to weigh the benefits and risks
of a proposed course of treatment .... Id.
127. "The extent of a prisoner's right under the [Due Process] Clause to avoid the unwanted administration
of antipsychotic drugs must be defined in the context of the inmate's confinement." Harper, 494 U.S. at 222; see
also id. at 227 (holding that the prisoner's right to resist administration of anti-psychotic drugs was limited by the
special facts presented in Harper).
128. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 752.
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condemn.129 By druggihg the prisoner against his will, the physician would help the
state sidestep Ford. The medication prescribed by the physician would restore a
level of competency to the prisoner, thereby enabling his execution to proceed.
Though the physician may not be in the death chamber operating the machinery of
execution, he is providing the crucial component which would allow the state to
continue with the execution. This is not an unimportant consideration. Only a
physician may provide the state with the means to circumvent Ford and proceed
with the execution, and by so acting, violates his ethical obligations.
The Perry decision is instructive in its distinction of Harper, but it does not
really resolve the issue. 130 With regard to the Due Process question posed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, the state court did not even attempt to frame the issue in
light of the test applied in Harper.13 1 The Perry court seemingly applied strict
scrutiny review,'32 something more demanding than the test in Harper.33 The
Louisiana court did not even attempt to make use of the factors utilized in the
balancing test in Harper, and with regard to the Due Process analysis under the
Constitution, the Perry court applied a different formula to find its solution. 134 Of
course, this approach is only mandated for federal constitutional questions, and since
Perry was governed by the Louisiana Constitution, that court was free to frame the
issue as it chose. The persuasive value of the issue as framed, however, is limited
outside of Louisiana. 135
In addressing the Louisiana Constitution's equivalent of the U.S. Constitution's
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, the Louisiana
court employed two familiar doctrines. 36 First, it inquired into whether the
punishment was "severely degrading to human dignity." 37 This inquiry is similar
to the abstract judgment by the United States Supreme Court when it employs the
evolving standards of decency analysis.33 The Louisiana Court also employed a
129. Id.
130. Id. at 755.
131. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (outlining the factor-balancing test applied in Harper).
132. See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 755-61 (resolving the issue under state constitutional provisions but seeking
a "compelling state interest" for the regulation and requiring that the state regulation be "narrowly confined" only
to further that purpose).
133. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 223 (stating the standard for testing a "prison regulation claimed to infringe on
an inmate's constitutional rights is to ask whether the regulation is 'reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests."' (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89).
134. See id. at 224-25 (defining the factors to be considered by reviewing courts when evaluating the validity
of a state regulation conflicting with the prisoner's right).
135. At least one court has accepted the reasoning proposed by the Louisiana Supreme Court. In Singleton
v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 55-56 (S.C. 1993), the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the medicate-to-execute
scheme with reference to Perry, adopting virtually the same reasoning as that case.
136. See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 761-71 (discussing the Louisiana state constitutional provision prohibiting the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment).
137. Id. at 766.
138. See supra notes 21, 27-31 and accompanying text (defining the abstract judgment employed by the
United States Supreme Court when using the evolving standards of decency doctrine).
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proportionality analysis, which like Justices Marshall and Powell in Ford, asked
whether the goals of retribution and deterrence were served by the medicate-to-
execute method. 3 9
The Louisiana court felt the state's motivation in treating Perry was the first
inquiry of whether the punishment was degrading to human dignity.' 4 The court
found that under the forced medication procedure "Perry [would] be treated as a
thing, rather than a human being.""'' His mind and body would be converted, against
his will, to serve the state's purpose of carrying out the execution. 142 Perry would be
forced to undergo an ever-increasing amount of suffering as he was forced "to yield
to the state the control of his mind, thoughts and bodily functions."'' 43 In the end,
Perry would suffer more than other death row inmates since he would have to bear
all of this in addition to his final execution.'" Viewed in this light, one loses sight
of why Perry was sentenced to death or what purpose the death penalty is to serve.
In its proportionality analysis, the court addressed the goals of the death penalty
with regard to Perry's case when it examined the place of deterrence and retribution
in this scheme.145 With regard to deterrence, the Louisiana court took a very narrow
view toward the target audience.' 46 It felt that only those offenders who become
insane while on death row were relevant. 47 The court described this small class of
offenders as being too remote from consideration for deterrence to have any
effect. 48 As the court stated, a capital offender weighing the risk of being caught
and punished was unlikely to "attach crucial weight to the fact that he cannot be
executed should he become insane" and then be deterred. 149 The court's approach,
however, ignores the fact that once anti-psychotic medication was administered to
Perry, he would no longer be in this small class of offenders. Assuming anti-
psychotic medication is effective, his rationality would be restored to some degree.
Perry seemingly would stand among the other prisoners on death row--only
139. See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 766-68 (employing a proportionality analysis asking whether the goals of
deterrence and retribution are served by the medicate-to-execute scheme); see also supra notes 32-39 and
accompanying text (discussing Justices Marshall and Powell's approach to the goals of deterrence and retribution
as noted in Ford).
140. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 765-66.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 766-68.
146. Id. at 766.
147. Id. at 766-67.
148. "[It is highly unlikely that the deterrent value of the death penalty will be increased measurably by
including within the class of convicted offenders who may be executed a category that has been exempt from
execution for centuries." Id. at 766.
149. Id.
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different due to his medication. Since deterrence has been found to be a valid goal
for those on death row, it would seem to apply for Perry. 150
The Perry court's approach toward the goal of retribution may not be strongly
persuasive since it seems to exist independent of United States Supreme Court
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence; the Louisiana court made its own
pronouncements of legal principle in this area and failed to cite to federal courts
interpreting the goal of retribution.' 5 ' The Louisiana court applied a limitation on the
goal of retribution, declaring that it is to be tempered by the concept of human
dignity. 52 The court then relied on its earlier finding that the medicate-to-execute
scheme violated this concept, and as such, the goal of retribution had no application
in this context. 153 In sum, the goals of punishment would not be served by
medicating Perry and proceeding with his execution. 154
One must note that these examples of how state courts have addressed this issue
are merely persuasive. They do not need to be taken into account by other states or
federal courts addressing the issue. The fact that these issues may be resolved by
differing state constitutional provisions with varying history and interpretation
leaves the matter open for a state-by-state adjudication. Also, since the federal courts
have remained silent on the issue, a federal constitutional question remains.
IV. ATTACKING THE ISSUE-SEEKING AN ANSWER
To treat the issue properly, a reviewing court should be obligated to consider the
full weight of the defendant's claim. It is incorrect to rest, as the Singleton court did,
on the luxury of precedent when that precedent was decided with different realities
in mind than the medicate-to-execute scheme. 155 A court seeking an answer in this
case will face two constitutional questions. First, it must decide the merits of the
prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim. Whether competency, as required by Ford, can
be achieved by the medicate-to-execute scheme, and whether the reasons for
protecting the insane, as noted in Ford, apply in this context. Second, the reviewing
court will have to address the prisoner's Due Process challenge to the medicate-to-
execute scheme by determining the applicability of Harper, and resolve the conflict
between the prisoner's rights and the state's obligation to carry out the execution.
Only when these questions are asked-when a court seeks to address the issue of
whether the medicate-to-execute scheme is valid-will an answer be forthcoming.
150. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,185-86(1976) (holding that the death penalty served as an effective
deterrent for certain offenders).
151. See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 767-68 (discussing retribution by reference to scholars, not by reference to
federal courts' interpretation of this goal of punishment).
152. See id. at 767 (limiting the "unqualified pursuit of retribution" with the principle of "human dignity").
153. Id. at 768.
154. Id.
155. See supra Part HI.A (reviewing the Arkansas Supreme Court's analysis of the proper application of
Washington v. Harper in the medicate-to-execute scheme).
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A. The Eighth Amendment
In deciding the Eighth Amendment implications of the medicate-to-execute
scheme, a reviewing court might find it helpful to explore the reasons behind the
prohibition on executing the insane, as noted in the Ford opinion. 15 6 If these reasons
were found to exist in the special case of medicating the insane, then Ford might
well decide the issue. Consideration of competency of the prisoner, the basic
question in Ford, might easily determine the application of Ford and the validity of
the medicate-to-execute scheme.
1. Addressing Competency and the Applicability of Ford v. Wainwright
A proper reading of Ford declares that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
execution of the insane or the incompetent, but it does not provide a proper standard
to judge competency.157 Perhaps the Court felt that the Eighth Amendment did not
require a uniform standard, and that the issue was best left to the states to determine
the appropriate standard for competency. Regretfully, Justice Powell was the sole
voice on the Court to provide a possible competency standard which focused on the
cognitive understanding of the prisoner.
158
The cognition standard proposed by Powell would function well in the
medicate-to-execute scheme. The purpose of anti-psychotic drugs, as noted in
Harper, would be to restore rationality to the prisoner, a level of understanding, so
that he would not be a threat to himself or others.159 This rational understanding
might, in a dark favor, allow the prisoner to understand his sentence of death and the
reason for his fate, thus meeting the cognition test for competency.16 In a technical
sense, the prisoner would be competent for execution, but this technical distinction
might not be sufficient.
The prisoner receiving anti-psychotic medication will only be "sane" for as long
as his dosage remains effective. 16' The medication is all that guarantees the
competency of the prisoner since he still suffers from some form of psychosis. 162 In
this case, symptoms are only masked, or subdued temporarily. The underlying
disease is still present. The prisoner is only competent due to the intervention of the
156. See supra Part II.A (discussing the prohibition on executing the insane).
157. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (noting the absence of a competency standard in Ford).
158. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Powell's proposed competency
standard).
159. Harper, 494 U.S. at 214.
160. Id. (stating that anti-psychotic drugs would "assist the patient in organizing his or her thought processes
and regaining a rational state of mind.").
161. Keith A. Byers, Incompetency, Execution, and the Use of Antipsychotic Drugs, 47 ARK. L. REV. 361,
377 (1994).
162. Id.
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drugs providing a form of artificial sanity. 63 Whether Ford would recognize this
distinction as significant remains unclear, but physicians treating the prisoner would
still consider him a mental patient, incompetent but for his drugs. 4 This may not
have been the concept of sanity intended by the Court in Ford. The fact that Justice
Powell was the sole voice on the Court supporting the cognition standard which
would tolerate this result leaves an affirmative answer in doubt.'65 Even if one
accepted this as the proper standard though, and successfully argues that Ford does
not prevent the execution from proceeding, a defendant may still argue that the
medicate-to-execute scheme was a punishment prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment.
2. The Eighth Amendment and the Goals of Punishment: Deterrence and
Retribution
Though medical treatment is not a punishment, the reviewing court could
assume for the sake of argument that since the treatment is necessary to allow the
punishment of execution to proceed, the scheme viewed as a whole might be a
punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. This interpretation seems
appropriate when a state is motivated to use anti-psychotic medication for the
purposes of execution. As a punishment, the medicate-to-execute scheme would be
subject to the constraints of the Eighth Amendment. As the controlling case for the
insane and the death penalty, the reasoning behind Ford might help in defining the
application of the Eighth Amendment to the medicate-to-execute scheme.
In finding the protection for the insane in the Eighth Amendment, the Court
applied the evolving standards of decency analysis. 166 As noted above, this analysis
involves an examination of objective indicia of public sentiment and an abstract
judgment by the Court. 167 The former approach would be of limited use since the
medicate-to-execute scheme is a nearly untouched issue by the states, but the later
approach inquiring into the goals of punishment might resolve this problem.
The abstract approach to the evolving standards of decency analysis involves an
inquiry into the concept of human dignity which forms the heart of the Eighth
Amendment. 168 As noted in Gregg v. Georgia, concept of human dignity requires
that the punishment in question serve the goals of deterrence and retribution. 69
163. Ptolemy H. Taylor, Comment, Execution of the "Artificially Competent" :Cruel and Unusual?, 66 TUL.
L. REv. 1045, 1059 n. 100 (1992).
164. Id.
165. Supra note 9 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 20-41 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's use of the evolving standards of
decency inquiry in Ford).
167. Supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
168. Supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
169. Supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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Justices Marshall and Powell found these goals to be lacking in Ford.70 The
medicate-to-execute scheme, on the other hand, poses a solution to the problems
noted in Ford with regard to deterrence and retribution, requiring a re-examination
of these goals.
In addressing deterrence, Marshall's justification for not executing the insane
would be inapplicable to the medicate-to-execute scheme. 7' Assuming the efficacy
of anti-psychotic medication, that unique feature which sets the insane apart as a
special class, a lack of competency, would be removed with the restoration of
rationality. 7 2 Formerly insane prisoners will join the rest of society, entitled and
subject to, equal justice. The former concern that criminals would not identify with
the execution of an insane prisoner would no longer apply since the difference
between them and the condemned has been removed. 173 Measuring deterrence is, of
course, a difficult task, but the Court has stated despite this uncertainty, deterrence
is a real and valid goal.174 The execution of a prisoner under the medicate-to-execute
scheme may then provide another method to deter criminals.
The case for retribution, viewed in light of Powell's comments, seems even
more straightforward. 175 Justice Powell, of course, rested his view of retribution on
the same ground as his cognition standard for competency-the accused must know
what his death sentence meant and why it was being inflicted upon him. 176 Again,
assuming that anti-psychotic medication can impose a level of rational thought upon
a prisoner, retribution will be served as restored competency will allow the prisoner
to understand his death sentence and the reason for it.177 The validity of retribution
in this context might be questioned however.
While retribution is a valid goal, it "is no longer the dominant objective of the
criminal law," and it may have limits. 78 The Louisiana Supreme Court in Perry
expressed two limits on this goal: a required respect for human dignity and a need
for proportionality between the punishment and the crime. 179 In Perry, the court felt
170. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text (outlining Justices Marshall and Powell's approach toward
deterrence and retribution in Ford).
171. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (noting Justice Marshall's position on deterrence with
regard to insane prisoners being based on their membership in a special class set apart from sane prisoners).
172. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 214 (stating that anti-psychotic drugs may "assist the patient in organizing his
or her thought processes and regaining a rational state of mind.")
173. Supra note 34 and accompanying text.
174. "[F]or many [offenders] the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent. There are carefully
contemplated murders... where the possible penalty of death may enter into the cold calculus that precedes the
decision to act." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185-86.
175. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (summarizing Justice Powell's approach toward the goal
of retribution in Ford).
176. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (repeating Powell's proposed competency standard as
requiring an understanding of the death penalty and the reason for its infliction on the prisoner).
177. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 214 (stating the effect of anti-psychotic drugs as "that the medication will assist
the patient in organizing his or her thought processes and regaining a rational state of mind.").
178. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
179. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 768.
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that human dignity required a deference to the autonomy of individuals; that they
not be treated as mere objects to serve the state.' 80 In referring to proportionality, the
Perry court read even the strictest of retributivists as requiring an execution free
from excessive suffering. 8' In this, Perry was supported by Supreme Court
precedent. 182 The Perry court felt both of these limits were crossed when the state
sought to medicate a prisoner for purposes of execution.'83 The prisoner "would be
forced to endure the usurpation of control of his body and mind" to be manipulated
to serve the state's ends. Additionally, unlike other death row prisoners, he would
suffer more than the pain and fear inherent in the method of execution due to his
incomprehension of events leading toward his death.'84 One must realize that the
Perry decision was based on the Louisiana constitution, and that court's
interpretation of retribution is neither reflective nor binding on other federal or state
courts reviewing the issue. 8 5 However, the human dignity concept of retribution
noted by the Perry court was, at least in part, discussed in Ford.18 6
In his concurring opinion, Powell also cited the core value of human dignity and
its prohibition on gratuitous infliction of suffering as a reason for the protection of
the insane.' 87 To "send a great offender quick into another world, when he is not of
a capacity to fit himself for it" would be cruel. '88 The restoration of rationality from
the administration of anti-psychotic medication would give the condemned prisoner
this cruel opportunity. At the very least, the prisoner would comprehend his fate.
Fear and mental anguish would come with this understanding, but they would be the
same emotions felt by other criminals sentenced to death who did not have the
excuse of insanity as an escape from their fate. If the Court accepts these goals of
punishment as determinative of the issue, the condemned will no longer escape his
fate.
B. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Challenge
If ever a court seeks to directly address the validity of the Due Process challenge
to the medicate-to-execute scheme, it will be required to determine the applicability
of Harper and the address the concerns raised by Singleton and Perry. Harper's
application is not straightforward. That case could easily be distinguished since it
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,447 (1890) (noting that the Eighth Amendment required that methods
of execution not inflict more pain than necessary to extinguish the life of the condemned).
183. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 768.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 755.
186. Ford, 477 U.S. at 421.
187. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (noting Justice Powell's discussion of an undefined concept
of human dignity, also noted in Gregg, that forms the core of the Eighth Amendment).
188. Ford, 477 U.S. at 407.
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was not a death penalty case, 189 or following the Perry example, its required
consideration of the prisoner's medical interest might be found to be inapplicable
to the forcible medication scheme.' 9° It would be a difficult exercise in sophistry to
successfully argue that it could ever be within a prisoner's medical interest to further
a procedure which would culminate in his own execution. However a court decides
the matter of Harper's application, one thing is clear: the test from that case will
apply as binding precedent.
In Harper, the Court declared that the test it enunciated would be controlling
when determining the validity of a state prison regulation conflicting with the due
process rights of a prisoner.' 9' A reviewing court is therefore constitutionally bound
to ask whether the medicate-to-execute scheme was "reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests" by balancing the three factors noted in Harper: (1) whether
there was a "valid, rational relation between the legitimate governmental interest"
and the regulation; (2) the impact on the prison environment of accommodating the
right; and (3) "the absence of ready alternatives" as supporting the reasonableness
of the regulation."'' 92 At the very least, the Harper test will control the outcome of
the Due Process question.' 93
As reviewing courts seek to apply this test, they might find guidance and reason
to pause from the examples in Singleton and Perry. Singleton is a reminder that one
cannot merely assume an answer before asking the question. Due process requires
a consideration of Harper and its factor-balancing test. In this, Singleton clearly
failed.
With hesitation and careful thought, a reviewing court might find the questions
raised by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Perry to be helpful fodder for the Harper
factor-balancing test. Certainly the concerns about medical ethics and violation of
an individual's autonomy should be noted when courts consider the validity of the
government's interest in the forcible medication scheme. 194 Similarly, those
concerns noted in Harper of the continuing danger of an untreated, mentally ill
prisoner would still be relevant in the medicate-to-execute scheme. A reviewing
court may be troubled with resolving the conflict between a state's duty to provide
treatment for its prisoners and the need for it to carry out punishments, but the final
result of accommodating the prisoner's right to refuse medical treatment poses an
even greater question.
189. Supra note 56 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text (outlining the Louisiana Supreme Court's concerns that
Harper could not apply in the medicate-to-execute scheme because of the requirement that the medication be in the
inmate's medical interest).
191. "We made quite clear that the standard of review we adopted.., applies to all circumstances in which
the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights [of the prisoner]." Harper, 494 U.S. at 224; see
also supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (relating the Harper factor-balancing test).
192. Harper, 494 U.S. at 225.
193. Id. at 224.
194. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text (reviewing the Louisiana court's invalidation of the
medicate-to-execute scheme as interfering with important concerns of patient autonomy and medical ethics).
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A prisoner allowed to refuse anti-psychotic drugs is a prisoner forever trapped
in madness. He must be isolated and shunned by prison officials and staff for their
own safety. He will be a constant danger to himself. This result ignores the state's
affirmative duty of care and may harm the prisoner in ways that cannot be
contemplated by sane persons. One wonders how the Constitution could tolerate this
extreme example of individualism despite an obligation of care.
V. CONCLUSION
Questions seek answers, but in this case, the questions seem to multiply
providing further problems for reviewing courts. The validity of the forcible
medication scheme under the Constitution will revolve around two very different
amendments. The Eighth Amendment is a command that punishment must not be
applied where it would be cruel to do so. 195 The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is a statement affirming the rights of the individual to act
free from government control. 196 In the medicate-to-execute scheme, these
provisions collide resulting in a punishment that may be valid and an individual
right that results in cruelty if recognized. The difficult judgment in this case calls for
an accommodation between the state and the individual that will hopefully result in
a respect for human dignity. This accommodation of principle will only be
forthcoming though when the courts honestly seek to ask the question.
195. See supra notes 20-23, 27-31 (outlining the approach of the Supreme Court toward the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment).
196. See supra notes 59-61 (discussing, briefly, the conflict between a prisoner's substantive due process
rights and obligations of the state to ensure a safe prison environment as noted in Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-26).
